China solar is not dead. It was overbuilt.

IEA data show that renewable additions reached roughly 800 GW in 2025, with solar PV accounting for more than 600 GW. China alone commissioned around 370 GW of solar PV in 2025. On demand alone, solar remains a large growth industry.

The problem is manufacturing capacity. CSIS notes that China dominates polysilicon, wafers, cells, and modules by a wide margin. Reuters and CNBC describe an industry whose manufacturing capacity can meet roughly twice global demand, resulting in price wars, margin compression, and losses. The industry can grow while shareholders still suffer.

2025 narrowed the loss; Q1 2026 weakened again.

LONGi’s 2025 revenue was CNY 70.347 billion, down 14.82% year over year. Net loss attributable to shareholders was CNY 6.420 billion, narrower than the 2024 loss of CNY 8.592 billion. Operating cash flow turned positive at CNY 4.359 billion. That supported a “worst is easing” interpretation.

Q1 2026 did not confirm the turn. Revenue fell 18.03% year over year to CNY 11.192 billion. Net loss attributable to shareholders widened to CNY 1.920 billion, and operating cash flow was negative at CNY 2.449 billion. The next few quarters matter more than the narrative.

CNY 12 is an area to watch, not a confirmed bottom.

The rebound should be read in three stages.

Anti-involution must turn from slogan into actual closures.

Reuters frames polysilicon consolidation as a test of China’s broader overcapacity reform. CNBC reports that Chinese authorities have called for coordinated measures including capacity control, pricing enforcement, mergers, and intellectual-property protection. These are important signals.

But restructuring is hard. Local governments may resist closing factories in their own regions, and producers may increase output again when prices rise. Investors should therefore track actual utilization, inefficient-capacity exits, and price durability rather than policy language alone.

There are early pricing signals.

PV Tech and pv magazine reported late-2025 and early-2026 price increases across wafers, cells, and modules, with LONGi and other leading wafer producers lifting quotes. The key question is whether customers accept those prices through contracts.

BC/HPBC and storage are the right survival strategy.

LONGi’s 2025 materials highlight the ramp of HPBC 2.0. The company cited mainstream module power of 650–660W, peak power of 670W, and maximum mass-production conversion efficiency of 24.8%. It also reported 46 GW of in-house HPBC 2.0 cell capacity and 11 GW of collaborative capacity by year-end 2025, with 22.87 GW of BC module sales.

This matters because commodity module scale alone does not protect shareholders in a price war. LONGi needs its technology advantage to become average-selling-price premium, margin repair, and cash flow. Its solar-plus-storage expansion is directionally sensible, but the market will trust it more when the income statement improves.

Watch first, size later.

Growth is alive, but liquidity alone is not enough.

The Growth side of solar remains attractive: electrification, energy security, renewable deployment, and storage integration support long-duration demand. But LONGi’s stock is more sensitive to pricing and margin than to installations alone. Easier liquidity can help, but it cannot fully repair a price war.

The biggest bias is “industry growth equals stock upside.”

• More solar installations do not automatically mean higher LONGi profits.
• A 47% drawdown can be attractive, but losses can make it a value trap.
• Policy announcements are not the same as actual capacity exits.
• A good company and a good entry price must be separated.

This article is general educational market commentary based on public company materials, major news coverage, and public market data. It does not incorporate each reader’s taxes, FX exposure, transaction costs, or risk tolerance.

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